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To The ReADeR
Western water law is a bit peculiar. It provides limited usage 
rights to parties who have legal claims on water. Most of the 
rules date to the settlement of the western United States in the 
nineteenth century. The traditional rules, which were codified by 
state legislatures, worked well in an agricultural economy. But, 
as changes in values evolved, some limits inherent in the prior 
appropriation doctrine have become apparent. It was, and still 
can be, difficult to change the use of water from its historic des-
ignation to one with greater value. Such is the case for restoring 
instream flows through water markets.
Societies with strong property rights allow parties to protect 
their property, develop it, trade it, or give it away. They enjoy 
greater prosperity and freedom than societies that impose many 
restrictions on property or suffer from a lack of clarity in rules. As 
Brandon Scarborough explains in this Policy Series, restrictions in 
water rights and uncertainty about how particular water trades 
can be affected limited the ability of parties to voluntarily use 
water for environmental benefits. 
As often happens when the rules are unclear, people make 
do and struggle to create new arrangements that allow resources 
to move to higher-valued uses. Water rights have evolved in re-
cent years as parties express desires to sell, lease, or give water 
for environmental or recreational purposes. Legal entrepreneurs 
plowed new ground. Some states have assisted in the move to 
expanded water rights, others have been less supportive. This 
Policy Series provides guidance for improving the legal environ-
ment for parties who wish to engage in the beneficial exchange 
of water rights.
This essay is part of the PERC Policy Series of papers on timely 
environmental topics. This issue was edited by Roger Meiners and 
Laura Huggins and designed by Mandy-Scott Bachelier.
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A 1.3 million mile network of rivers and streams winds through 
the American West. It is a lifeline to economic, environmental, and 
social amenities. Water diverted from streams supports burgeon-
ing communities, businesses, and an expansive agricultural sec-
tor. Water left instream is vital to the maintenance of complex 
riparian ecosystems, water quality, and species conservation. It 
also provides recreational opportunities and aesthetic values. In 
recent decades, competition among offstream and instream wa-
ter users has intensified as pressure to divert water from streams 
for growing populations is countered by a widening interest in 
improving and protecting stream flows for environmental and 
recreational purposes.
Historically, the demand for water and the institutions govern-
ing its allocation and use have favored economic applications, such 
as mining, agriculture, power generation, and municipal uses. As 
a result, much of the West’s scarce water resources are allocated 
to uses that are inconsistent with new demands for free-flowing 
streams. Moreover, because western water laws evolved in ac-
cordance with the desire to divert water from streams, efforts to 
maintain or improve stream flows have been complicated.
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The institutions governing 
instream flows have undergone 
considerable changes, especially in 
recent decades. Early efforts to pro-
tect flows that relied on state regula-
tions and restrictions on new water 
developments are being replaced 
with market-based options that let 
voluntary buyers and sellers trade 
water rights for instream purposes, such as protecting fish. Mar-
ket activity is increasing, but additional changes would expand 
opportunities for trade, reduce the associated transaction costs, 
and increase the amount of water flowing through streams. 
This Policy Series explores the evolving institutional set-
tings in western states1 for restoring and preserving instream 
flows. The focus is on how markets can provide an efficient and 
equitable solution for allocating water among increasingly com-
petitive offstream and instream demands, while also providing 
economic incentives for improved water use efficiencies and 
conservation. This essay also identifies the underlying barriers 
that complicate or thwart water markets and provides thoughts 
on how they may be overcome. 
WATeR RIghTS In The WeST
To clarify the challenges facing the protection of instream 
flows, it is important to understand the institutions that govern 
water use and allocation and how they have evolved. The 1848 
discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill in California sparked a migration 
to the region and with it, the need to divert water from streams. 
Lacking an effective governmental authority,2 miners estab-
lished an extralegal system to protect increasingly scarce water 
resources. Property rights to water evolved based on the prin-
Much of the West’s 
scarce water 
resources are 
allocated to uses that 
are inconsistent with 
new demands for 
free-f lowing streams.
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cipal of priority: “first in time, first in right.”  “He who first turned 
the waters of a stream from its course, or of a lake from its bed, 
and applied them to beneficial and continuing use was first in a 
property right in that stream commensurate to and concurrent 
with that use” (Hess 1916, 484). Subsequent users could stake a 
claim to remaining stream flows only if more senior right holders’ 
entitlements could first be fulfilled. In drought years, some users 
might not receive any water while others would collect only a 
portion of their allotment. In other words, having a water right, 
especially a junior priority, was no guarantee that one received 
a full entitlement.
As the West developed, this system of water allocation, known 
as the doctrine of prior appropriation, was incorporated into 
state law. New water users could obtain a legal water right from 
the state if certain conditions were met. Most commonly, states 
required water to be physically diverted from streams3 and used 
in a beneficial manner as determined by the state. In addition, 
rights would be issued only if the additional diversion of water 
would not harm a prior (more senior) appropriator’s right. To be 
more precise, water right holders do not take ownership in the 
physical water being diverted from the stream; rather the state 
grants a right to use water in a beneficial manner—a usufruct 
right. The states, through their constitutions, maintain ownership 
of the water resource for the public, thereby giving states the 
authority to create and appropriate rights to water (see Sax et 
al. 2000). Nevertheless, existing water rights are generally secure 
and may be held indefinitely unless abandoned or forfeited by 
nonuse or non-beneficial use.4 
transferability of rights
Water rights established under the prior appropriation 
doctrine may be transferred to other users through voluntary 
transactions. In general, water right holders may lease, sell, or 
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trade their water rights, or a portion thereof, assuming the state’s 
requirements of a diversion, beneficial use, and non-injury to 
other users are maintained.5 
The ability to trade water rights among various applications 
is particularly important in the arid West for a number of reasons. 
First, it provides a voluntary means of reallocating scarce water 
resources to meet new or changing water demands. For example, 
as urban economies continue to expand, municipal and industrial 
demands are being met in part through acquisitions of other 
water rights, primarily from agricultural users. Similarly, as the 
desire to improve instream flows widens, voluntary trades with 
current water users will help to meet those demands. 
Second, because much of the West’s available water sup-
plies are currently allocated to water right holders, there is 
little un-appropriated water available to prospective new users. 
Historically, water availability concerns were addressed through 
supply-side strategies, such as the construction of dams and 
reservoirs to store and manage water. Although effective, new 
infrastructure projects are generally no longer feasible because 
of extraordinary economic costs and growing environmental 
concerns. And thirdly, the ability to transfer water rights facilitates 
the reallocation of scarce water supplies to higher valued uses, 
which creates incentives for conservation and improved water 
use efficiencies. Throughout the West, the value of water varies 
with location and use, creating a wide disparity in prices and the 
potential for economic gains through trade. For example, in one 
of the largest transfers of water from farmers to municipal users, 
San Diego County, in 2003, offered farmers in the Imperial Valley 
in Southern California roughly $260 per acre-foot of water. The 
farmers had been paying $15 to $20 per acre-foot (Murray 2003). 
In general, prices for municipal or industrial applications are higher 
than among agricultural uses (Brewer et al. 2007) and illustrative 
of the potential benefits that could be gained from trade.
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Defining rights
While the prior appropriation 
system provides the basis for water 
markets and reallocation of water 
to meet changing demands, certain 
characteristics of water rights funda-
mentally affect their transferability. 
Most importantly, water rights must 
be well defined and enforceable. Uncertainty in one’s right to 
water, ability to use it in a way deemed beneficial to the user, or 
ability to protect rights from harm, introduces added costs and 
diminishes the incentive to pursue trades. As a consequence, 
the expected gains from trade decline, trading activity falls, and 
water remains in lower valued uses. Imagine wanting to buy a 
plot of land now used for farming. Your intention is to restore 
the land to native grasses and forest cover for wildlife. You are 
willing to pay market price for it until discovering the deed to 
the land includes unclear information about the lot size, where 
the property lines are, and who the rightful owner is. In addition, 
you learn the state may prohibit certain land uses and it is not 
clear that the land is protected from other users. Your willingness 
to pay immediately declines due to the costs of defining the de-
tails of the property, the uncertainty of trespass, and ambiguity 
in the long-term investment in the land. The result: fewer land 
transactions or investments will be made, more land will remain 
in lower valued uses, and a smaller amount of wildlife habitat 
will be provided. Similar conditions can arise when acquiring 
water rights, notably when the end use is for a non-traditional 
use, such as instream flows. 
A surface water right certificate typically defines the place 
and nature of use, amount of water as a measure of flow or vol-
ume, and the priority date. Throughout the West, however, the 
actual amount of water used often differs from that stated on the 
Uncertainty in 
one’s right to water 
introduces added 
costs and diminishes 
the incentive to 
pursue trades. 
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water right. “Early appropriations. . .were frequently in excess of 
actual need because there was no administrative system to police 
the amounts claimed” (Sax et al. 2000, 236). As a result, the paper 
claims to water often exceed actual use. Moreover, as irrigators 
switched crops and implemented new technologies to deliver 
and apply water more efficiently, historical water use may have 
declined, further widening the disparity between paper claims 
and actual use. The same disparity arises today in heavily or over-
appropriated basins in which more junior water right holders 
receive little or no water in dry years despite their stated entitle-
ment. In other instances, the volume of water normally diverted 
may be in excess of one’s paper claim. Such illegal or excessive 
diversions are not uncommon and may go uncontested. 
Only once a transfer is initiated, a dispute is filed, or a state 
‘general’ or basin specific adjudication is mandated, are water rights 
investigated and more clearly defined. Every western state is in the 
process of clarifying existing water rights, but the process is lengthy 
and will take decades to complete. The Montana Water Court, for 
example, was created in 1979 to facilitate statewide adjudication 
and decree of more than 219,000 water rights. Sixteen years later, 
overwhelmed by the process, the legislature increased funding and 
available resources to the Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation (DNRC) and the state Water Court to try to meet the 
projected completion date of 2020. 6 Although the process is slow 
and costly to taxpayers and water right holders, it will help states 
inventory available water resources, better clarify existing rights 
for water right holders, and identify abandoned or forfeited rights 
to water that may be appropriated to other users. 
To be clear, the adjudication process is intended to better 
define right holders’ claims to use water and provide legal clarity 
of rights in order to settle disputes. It does not, however, clarify 
rights to the extent necessary for transfers to other users. In fact, 
the amount of water listed on a decreed water right often dif-
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fers from the amount that may be 
transferred to another use or user. 
In order to protect third parties (the 
“no injury” rule),7 the state or court 
can restrict the amount that may be 
transferred. In the case of transfers to 
instream flows, this amount is generally limited to the historical 
consumptive use portion of one’s right—the amount of water 
historically consumed through evapotranspiration8 and in prod-
ucts such as crops that is not returned to the stream. 
Protection of all legitimate right holders is critical to an efficient 
market. However, where rights are unclear, disputes are common 
and may tie up transfers for years (Thompson 1993). Moreover, 
“the no harm rule makes any trade vulnerable to a variety of con-
stituent claims, some legitimate and some pure holdup” (Libecap 
2005). In many cases, disputes may not be limited to only other 
water right holders. In California, any party, whether a water user 
or business supported by water users (agricultural product suppli-
ers, local stores, schools, etc.), may protest transfers if they believe 
they will be adversely affected by the transfer (Dutkowsky 2009). 
With multiple parties having the right to intervene in cases of 
proposed transfers, the transaction costs can be substantial while 
the expectation of such costly disputes creates a strong deterrent 
to entering into trades (Hennessy 2004; Ruml 2005). To illustrate, 
imagine if existing property owners could intervene in your at-
tempt to lease or sell your home, claiming the new residents will 
somehow injure their property rights. Fewer homes would be sold 
or rented, as the costs of such deals would increase.
Enforcement of rights
Equally important to well-defined and tradable water rights is 
the enforcement of rights. Throughout the West, excessive with-
drawals and illegal diversions deplete scarce water resources and 
Protection of all 
legitimate right 
holders is critical to 
an efficient market.
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harm legitimate right holders as well as stream flows. The costs of 
enforcement reduce expected gains from trade and discourage 
potential buyers and sellers from entering into transfers. 
In general, states do not monitor and police all water us-
ers. Thus, illegal or excess withdrawals can go unnoticed until a 
dispute arises or adjudication is initiated. Even when rights are 
enforced by the state, fines may be insignificant and provide little 
deterrent for infractions. For example, until recently the maximum 
penalty in Washington was $100 per day—potentially less than 
the value of the water or the cost of buying water from other 
users. The fines were increased to between $100 and $5,000 per 
day depending on the severity of the violation, but only seven 
fines have been assessed since 2003 because “monetary penalties 
are difficult, contentious, and require extensive staff time and 
attorney resources” (Washington Department of Ecology 2008, 
1). In Montana the fines are as high as $1,000 per day, but only a 
handful have been issued as few violations are reported due in 
part to a lack of anonymity and fear of repercussions from other 
users filing a complaint with the state.9 
Despite constraints on the transferability of water rights, 
markets have proven to be an effective tool in reallocating water 
to adjust to changing demands. As water resources have become 
more scarce and valuable, buyers and sellers have found ways to 
overcome barriers and move water to higher valued uses. People 
wanting to enhance stream flows 
for aesthetic, environmental, and 
recreational uses through voluntary 
channels are now facing similar chal-
lenges. Moreover, a long history of 
water laws and institutions favoring 
economic water uses poses an addi-
tional constraint to providing water 
instream for non-traditional uses. 
Excessive 
withdrawals and 
illegal diversions 
deplete scarce water 
resources and harm 
legitimate right 
holders.
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PRoTeCTIng STReAM FloWS
Historical demands for water, with the exception of sufficient 
water for navigational purposes or for hydropower generation, 
have been almost exclusively for offstream uses such as mining, 
agricultural, municipal, and business applications. Undiverted 
water was often seen as wasteful. As President Hoover said in 
1926, “true conservation of water is not the prevention of its use. 
Every drop of water that runs into the sea without yielding its full 
commercial returns to the nation is an economic waste” (quoted 
in Clements 2000, 79).
This sentiment was instilled in western water laws with the 
requirement of a diversion and state-specified definitions of 
beneficial uses, which did not initially include environmental 
or recreational uses. These laws effectively precluded voluntary 
agreements to protect or improve stream flows, whether through 
new appropriations or trading of existing offstream water rights 
to instream uses (Huffman 1983, 273). Gradually, and to varied de-
grees, states have expanded legal systems to recognize instream 
flows as a beneficial use and to provide a means of restoring or 
protecting them, including the reallocation of water through 
voluntary trades. 
Today, there are basically four ways to protect instream 
flows. One relies on state restrictions or regulations that limit 
further declines in flows by essentially closing streams to new 
appropriations or requiring mitigation of groundwater with-
drawals.10 Second are cases involving the public trust doctrine 
or the Endangered Species Act (ESA).11 In these cases, one’s right 
to divert water from streams may be denied or diminished in 
order to maintain sufficient water instream for the public inter-
est, including protection of threatened or endangered species. 
A third is to appropriate water for instream purposes. Like water 
rights for offstream uses, private parties or state agencies apply 
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for rights to leave water in its natural course. And fourth, stream 
flows may be improved and protected by acquiring existing water 
rights from offstream users, so as to leave water instream that 
would otherwise have been diverted. Western states have, with 
mixed results, adopted one or a combination of these strategies 
to protect stream flows. 
maintaining status Quo Flows
To the early settlers in the West, the protection of streams 
for fish, recreation, or scenic values was of little concern. Instead, 
water was most valuable when diverted away from streams for 
uses such as mining and agricultural production. As the region 
developed, strong competition for water created a race to es-
tablish diversions and secure water rights. Despite lacking a well 
developed recording system or accurate inventory of available 
water, states appropriated water in step with these demands. As 
a result, by as early as 1900, many streams were already heavily 
or over-appropriated (Sherow 2007, 96). This meant the amount 
of water claimed by right holders was close to or exceeded the 
amount of water in streams.12
Once interest in protecting streams developed, much of the 
West’s water was already allocated to other uses. In addition, state 
legal systems governing water use and appropriation did not 
recognize environmental or recreational uses. As a consequence, 
anglers, environmentalists, and recreationists could neither 
apply for instream flow rights nor could they acquire existing 
offstream rights and leave the water instream to improve flows. 
Hence, people turned to political 
avenues. States responded by clos-
ing streams to new appropriations, 
in effect providing protection for 
any remaining (un-appropriated) 
water. For example, Oregon’s leg-
By as early as 1900, 
many streams were 
already heavily or 
over-appropriated.
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islature closed 23 streams along 
the Columbia River Gorge in 1915 
to protect existing flows for scenic 
waterfalls.13 Similarly, in Idaho in 
the 1920s, the state set limitations 
on new diversions to maintain lake 
levels for the preservation of scenic 
beauty, health, and recreation.14
Over the years, states adopted 
new strategies to protect existing 
flows from further declines, but continued to exclude private 
involvement in favor of expanded regulatory oversight. Common 
state regulations include the establishment of minimum flows15 
and the appropriation of new instream flow rights. In practice, 
the two strategies are similar. Each defines a specified amount 
or flow of water instream (not currently appropriated to other 
uses) that is off limits to future diversions. Because minimum 
flows and new appropriations could only be created from water 
not currently appropriated to other uses, existing right holders’ 
entitlements were unaffected.
Shortcomings to state policies have been identified that 
bring into question their effectiveness in meeting demands 
for water instream. First, minimum flows are generally estab-
lished by administrative ruling and thus are subject to political 
influence from special interests.16 As such, why and where they 
are established may not always be in accord with economic or 
ecological demands. Imagine the opposition from a farming 
community to a state agency’s proposal to set minimum flow 
requirements that could effectively eliminate any potential to 
expand agricultural production. In addition, minimum flow 
designations may be temporary and subject to appropriation 
to other uses under a different administration that may inter-
pret the statutes in favor of offstream water users (Gray 1993). 
States adopted new 
strategies to protect 
existing f lows from 
further declines, but 
continued to exclude 
private involvement 
in favor of expanded 
regulatory oversight.
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In Montana, for example, instream flows can be reallocated to 
other users, including offstream, once every five years by “show-
ing that the need of the petitioner [the new user] is greater than 
that identified by the original reservant for the instream flows.”17 
As a result, benefits from protected streams become uncertain 
over time and can be erased by the political reallocation of 
water to some other use. 
Second, minimum flows and new instream appropriations 
can, at best, protect only existing un-appropriated stream flows 
from future diversions, not improve or restore dewatered reaches. 
In Montana alone, there are an estimated 4,000 miles of temporar-
ily or chronically dewatered streams that lack sufficient flows to 
maintain local aquatic species (Montana Fish Wildlife and Parks 
2006). Establishing minimum flows in these streams will only 
perpetuate the existent low flows and inadequate habitat for 
local species, not restore flows to adequate levels.18 
Third, by the time states began designating minimum flows 
and creating new instream rights, there was a limited supply of 
streams with sufficient un-appropriated water to support target 
flows. More often, there was insufficient water to support all diver-
sionary needs, much less to provide adequate flows for fish and 
wildlife or recreation. Where minimum flows and new instream 
rights have been established, the rights holders are junior to 
other users, leaving little assurance that flows will be consistently 
maintained—especially in dry years when irrigation demands are 
highest and flows are most critical for fish and wildlife. 
CAn’T KeeP A gooD MARKeT DoWn
Historically, as the demands for water shifted among vari-
ous offstream uses, the value of voluntary markets to reallocate 
water among those uses became clear. Today the same strategy 
to reallocate water to other uses is being applied to meet new 
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instream flow demands. The inherent limitations of minimum 
flow designations and new appropriations have shown that the 
best way to restore dewatered streams and improve flows is by 
reducing the amount of water being diverted, whether in total 
quantity, timing, or location.19 The most equitable and efficient 
way to achieve this is by engaging in voluntary contracting with 
offstream water users to either acquire water rights and leave 
the water instream or by negotiating a change to their existing 
right that benefits stream conditions. 
Such a market-based approach to water allocation is not a 
new concept in the West. For more than a century, water has been 
reallocated among users for offstream uses through voluntary 
trades. A gradual expansion of water laws to include provisions 
for the trading of water for instream purposes has created op-
portunities for market-based transfers of water from traditional 
offstream uses to provide flows instream for environmental and 
recreational uses. 
Every western state permits the trading of water rights for 
instream uses, but the variation among states is marked and 
restrictions on private interests remain widespread. Below is a 
summary of state specific opportunities for instream flow mar-
keting. Overall, state and federal agencies remain the primary 
acquirers of water for instream uses; however, as state legal sys-
tems broaden to include provisions for private acquisition and 
for holding instream flow rights, the number of private entities 
acquiring water for such purposes has increased. 
  Arizona: In 1994, the state established the Arizona Water 
Protection Fund, a grant program that provides funds for 
river and stream restoration projects including acquisition 
of water for instream purposes. Private efforts to maintain 
or improve stream flows have been limited. The Nature 
Conservancy is awaiting approval for the state’s first 
instream flow transfer resulting from a land and water rights 
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acquisition, where the water will be left instream to provide 
fish and wildlife habitat. 
  California: Although California does not permit new 
appropriations for instream flows, changes to the state’s 
water code in 1991 permit any legal entity to acquire and 
change a consumptive use right for “purposes of preserving 
or enhancing wetlands habitat, fish and wildlife resources, 
or recreation.”20 Water right changes to instream use may be 
permanent, temporary, or what are referred to as “urgency 
changes,”21 creating opportunities for lease agreements and 
water right sales. Despite this, the complexity of California’s 
water laws increase transaction costs, potentially making 
smaller, private acquisitions prohibitively expensive (Boyd 
2003).22 Changes are underway, however, and private 
entities such as Ducks Unlimited and the Shasta River 
Water Trust have acquired water from offstream users and 
transferred the rights to instream use. 
  Colorado: In 1986, the legislature vested exclusive authority 
to the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) to acquire 
water rights by “grant, purchase, donation, bequest, devise, 
lease, exchange, or other contractual agreement, from or 
with any person, including any governmental entity.”23 
Colorado prohibits private entities from holding instream 
flow rights; however, any party may acquire an existing right 
and donate it to the CWCB for instream purposes. Private 
conservancies such as Trout Unlimited (TU), the Colorado 
Water Trust and the Nature Conservancy (TNC) have played 
an active role in preserving and restoring habitat and flows 
for fish and wildlife species.
  Idaho: State and federal agencies lease and purchase water 
rights from willing sellers to restore stream flows primarily 
for endangered or threatened species. The water is usually 
acquired through local rental pools, in which farmers can 
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lease water on a temporary basis to the agencies. Legislation 
passed in 2007 allows private right holders to donate all or 
a portion of water rights to the state to be held in trust for 
the preservation of minimum flows along the Big and Little 
Wood Rivers.24 
  Montana: In 1989, Montana’s Department of Fish, Wildlife 
and Parks (FWP) was granted authority to lease water rights 
to maintain fish flows on a limited number of streams. 
Legislation passed in 1991 expanded FWP’s authority to 
streams throughout the state. The option to lease water for 
instream flows was extended to the private sector in 1995, 
opening the door to private conservation groups such as 
TU and the Montana Water Trust that employ markets to 
improve flows for local fisheries. 
  Nevada: Opportunities for state and private entities to 
protect stream flows stem from the Nevada Supreme 
Court’s decision which held that instream uses of water for 
fish and recreation were considered beneficial. Together 
with state water statutes,25 this provides for temporary or 
permanent acquisitions of water for instream use. Private 
entities are free to acquire water rights from other users and 
to continue to hold that right once changed to an instream 
use. Conservation organizations such as TNC, the Great Basin 
Land and Trust, and Nevada Water Fowl Association have 
all acquired water for instream use; however, their funding 
has been primarily from governmental agencies. 
  New Mexico: Opportunities to improve stream flows 
through markets are limited. The legislature created the 
Strategic Water Reserve in 2005, a state funded program 
to acquire water primarily from agricultural users in order 
to improve flows for endangered species and to meet 
interstate water compacts. By acquiring water rights to 
maintain sufficient instream flows, the state may reduce 
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or eliminate costly litigation stemming from endangered 
species and interstate water conflicts. Private opportunities 
to acquire water for instream use have been complicated 
by unclear laws governing instream flows and transfers. 
  Oregon: The 1987 Instream Water Rights Act set the stage 
for voluntary private exchanges of water from consumptive 
to instream uses. The law confirmed the protection of 
water rights designated to instream use without the need 
for a diversion, while permitting the transfer of existing 
offstream use rights to instream rights through voluntary 
lease, purchase, or donation agreements. All water rights 
for instream uses are held in trust by the state. Private 
organizations such as Oregon Water Trust, the Deschutes 
River Conservancy, and the Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust 
have used markets to restore flows for local fish species.
  Utah: Until recently, only state agencies could acquire water 
for instream purposes. In 2007, statutory changes created 
a ten-year pilot program extending instream flow market 
opportunities to certain private interests. Conservation 
entities such as TU may lease water from farmers and 
ranchers to provide flows for fish. The pilot program is similar 
to the one in Montana, which proved to be successful and 
was made permanent in 2005. 
  Washington: The legislature established the Trust Water 
Rights program in 1991, allowing the state or private 
entities to acquire water rights for instream purposes. The 
Washington Water Trust, a private nonprofit organization, 
has leased and purchased water rights from primarily 
agricultural users to improve stream flows, reconnect 
migratory routes, and improve habitat for local fisheries. 
In 2000, the Washington Department of Ecology, the 
state’s water regulatory authority, started a Water Rights 
Acquisition Program that acquires water rights from willing 
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sellers, mostly for stream flow augmentation to benefit 
endangered or threatened fish species.
  Wyoming: Wyoming lacks provisions that would allow the 
state or any private entity to lease water rights for instream 
flows. The state may purchase rights or receive donated 
water rights that could then be transferred to instream use; 
however, no acquisitions or donations have occurred.
voluntary trades
Increasingly, demands for environmental and recreational 
flows are being met through voluntary trades that reallocate 
water into streams (Figure 1). Between 1987 and 2007, state, 
federal, and private entities restored more than ten million acre-
feet26 of water to streams through short- and long-term leases, 
donations, and permanent transfers. More than 2,800 transac-
tions27 were completed, exceeding a half-billion dollars in value 
(inflation adjusted).28
Despite progress, there remains stark variation among the 
western states in ability to buy, lease, or donate water rights 
for environmental or other purposes. In addition, where trades 
are permitted, the transaction costs 
involved can be substantial. As a 
consequence, water may remain 
in lower valued uses, incentives for 
improved water use efficiencies and 
conservation are diminished, and 
society bears unnecessary economic 
and environmental costs. Identifica-
tion and a better understanding of 
the factors that impede markets 
are critical steps toward improving 
water allocation and restoring de-
watered streams.
Between 1987 and 
2007, state, federal, 
and private entities 
restored more than 
ten million acre-feet 
of water to streams 
through short- 
and long-term 
leases, donations, 
and permanent 
transfers.
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Why noT MoRe MARKeTS?
No western state governs instream flow rights and transfers 
in the same manner as traditional offstream water rights. Legal 
restrictions limit the role of private parties in acquiring water for 
non-traditional purposes. And states remain reluctant to move 
away from centralized control of instream flows. As a result, de-
mands for flow restoration are still largely addressed, not through 
voluntary exchange among private interests, but through political 
means—a process that “is often slow, contentious, and expensive” 
(Sterne 1997, 206).
Figure 1: Annual Instream Flow Transactions 1987–2007 for all 
Western States
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In addition to legal and institu-
tional roadblocks, market expan-
sion is impeded by poorly defined 
water rights, inadequate enforce-
ment of rights, a lengthy and costly 
administrative process, regulatory 
uncertainty, and informational and 
cultural barriers. Consequently, vol-
untary transfers of water to instream 
purposes remain cumbersome and 
costly. These obstacles vary widely 
across states and the extent to which they may affect market 
activity within states. Figure 2 illustrates the differences among 
western states in the number of transactions made to enhance 
instream flows. Transactions are one measure to gauge the com-
parative success of state instream flow markets and, by extension, 
demonstrate how removing barriers may improve market activity 
and water allocation.29 
Transactions tend to be more common in states that per-
mit and encourage private involvement, including Oregon, 
Washington, and Montana. By comparison, far fewer voluntary 
transactions have occurred in the other western states. The op-
portunity for private participation alone, however, is insufficient 
to explain market activity. Anyone in California may acquire water 
for instream uses, but few transactions in California are private. 
Similarly, Nevada permits any private entity to acquire and hold 
instream flow rights; however, strong competition for limited 
water resources and limited demands for instream flows has 
quelled market activity. 
A review of current literature, statutes, and case studies, com-
bined with interviews with state administrators, conservation ad-
vocates, and various market practitioners has identified additional 
barriers that complicate the progression and expansion of markets 
Identification and a 
better understanding 
of the factors that 
impede markets 
are critical steps 
toward improving 
water allocation and 
restoring dewatered 
streams.
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for instream flows. Identification of these barriers illuminates the 
need for policy changes and improvements to the institutional 
environment governing water use and allocation in the West.
legal Barriers
Historically, the most prominent legal barriers to instream 
flows were states’ limited definitions of beneficial use and the 
laws prohibiting either new appropriations of instream flow 
rights or the transfer of existing consumptive rights to instream 
use. Today, all western states recognize certain instream uses as 
beneficial and no longer require water to be physically diverted 
Figure 2. Instream Flow Transactions 1987–2007
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in order to constitute a legal water right. Definitions of beneficial 
instream uses, however, are more restrictive in some states than 
in others, limiting the opportunities to protect flows.
Washington, for example, recognizes a number of instream 
flow uses as beneficial, including fish and wildlife maintenance 
and enhancement, protection of game and birds, recreation, 
scenic, and all other uses compatible with the enjoyment of the 
public waters of the state.30 On the other hand, Wyoming limits 
instream flows rights to the “minimum flow necessary” to “estab-
lish or maintain fisheries” (if the water is supplied from stored 
sources) and to “maintain or improve existing fisheries” (if from 
unappropriated waters). 31 As a comparison, imagine if a state 
law required all land to be used only for agriculture, urban, or 
industrial uses. Landowners would be in violation, and subject to 
losing their entitlement, if they altered their land use to provide 
environmental amenities, such as wildlife habitat, native grasses, 
wetlands, or forest cover. When states restrict water right hold-
ers from using water for whatever environmental or recreational 
purposes people support, fewer trades occur and fewer of those 
amenities will be provided.
Defining instream water as a beneficial use is a necessary legal 
condition for protecting stream flows, but it is not sufficient. Un-
like markets for offstream water uses most states place restrictions 
on private acquisition and holdership of water rights if used for 
instream uses, irrespective of whether or not the state recognizes 
such uses as beneficial. For instance, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyo-
ming prohibit private parties from holding an instream water 
right. Individuals may acquire offstream rights and convey them 
to the state with the intention of having their rights changed to 
instream use; however, there is no guarantee that stream flows 
will be maintained (see below). Utah limits acquisitions to leas-
ing and only by specified private conservation organizations. 
Arizona,32 California, Montana,33 Nevada, and New Mexico34 al-
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low any person to hold an instream 
flow right that was converted from 
an existing water right. Private 
parties may acquire consumptive 
water rights (whether through lease, 
purchase, or donation) and file for a 
temporary or permanent change of 
use to instream without relinquish-
ing ownership to the state. Wash-
ington and Oregon permit private 
acquisitions, but once the rights are 
changed to instream use they are 
held in trust by the state. Ownership 
is restored to the water right holder upon termination of tem-
porary conversions (leases or temporary donations). In addition, 
any private water right holder may temporarily or permanently 
donate all or a portion of unneeded consumptive water directly to 
the state without risk of forfeiting future use of the water, which 
would otherwise be subject to loss under the “use it or lose it” 
provision of the prior appropriation doctrine. 
The leading arguments in opposition to private appropria-
tion and ownership of instream rights originate from existing 
offstream users (Livingston and Miller 1986). Agricultural, mu-
nicipal, and industrial users fear that instream appropriations 
will reduce potential development by limiting future supplies. 
“For many opponents, there is simply no desire to allow a new 
interest group to share a resource that historically has been 
controlled and managed for the benefit of a few” (Fort 2000, 
159). Moreover, there is concern that the trading of water rights 
to uses other than for agricultural production can adversely 
affect local economies (Bourgeon, Easter, and Smith 2004; 
Hanak 2003). Others fear that instream flows will lead to greater 
scrutiny of their water rights and the potential of diminished 
When states restrict 
water right holders 
from using water 
for whatever 
environmental or 
recreational purposes 
people support, 
fewer trades occur 
and fewer of those 
amenities will be 
provided.
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access to water. Because water left instream is easily diverted 
by other users, enforcement often requires greater monitoring 
of instream rights as well as existing offstream users to ensure 
flows are maintained. This situation can increase the possibility 
of disputes and claims against other water right holders.
These arguments are problematic. Assuming states extend 
the provisions set forth in the prior appropriation doctrine to 
instream users, the risk of injury to existing users is unrealistic. 
Under the rule of “no injury,” the water rights of existing senior 
and junior water users should not be affected by any change to 
an existing right and, in the case of a new appropriation, no se-
nior water users will be injured. Second, because the amount of 
water needed to adequately improve stream flows is often small, 
transfers are unlikely to adversely impact a local community. In 
fact, where the value of water instream exceeds traditional uses, 
the economic gains from trade may improve local economies 
through expansion in fishing, hunting, and recreational oppor-
tunities. Third, the potential for greater scrutiny of existing rights 
and claims against offstream users is real, but for the benefit of 
all legal water users. Only users who are diverting or using water 
illegally or in excess of their entitlements are at risk of loss. When 
water rights are well defined and enforced, existing users should 
benefit from the right to sell water 
for instream flows.
Instream flows are often viewed 
as a common property resource, in 
which exclusion of or contracting 
with all beneficiaries is prohibitively 
costly. As such, it is expected that 
instream flows would be under-
produced if only provided by the 
private sector (Anderson and John-
son 1986). Moreover, in the context 
For many opponents, 
there is simply no 
desire to allow a 
new interest group 
to share a resource 
that historically has 
been controlled and 
managed for the 
benefit of a few.
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of markets and acquiring water for 
instream purposes, pricing of public 
resources can be difficult (Dellap-
enna 2005). Limiting the provision 
of stream flows to state agencies 
is, however, counter to the funda-
mentals of property rights inherent 
in the prior appropriation doctrine. 
Moreover, such limitations take al-
location decisions out of the hands 
of water users—including those 
wishing to enhance environmental 
conditions—who bear the direct 
costs and reap the benefits of such decisions. Extending use 
rights of instream flows to private entities would be legislatively 
simple even though it is politically difficult. Codification of strong 
water rights vastly increases the pool of buyers and sellers (Boyd 
2003) and, thereby, the opportunities to improve flows.
A look at historical transactions illustrates the benefits to re-
moving barriers that limit private entities from providing instream 
flows. In states permitting private acquisitions (Washington, Or-
egon, Montana, Nevada, California, New Mexico), more than 2,100 
transactions occurred between 1987 and 2007, compared to less 
than 130 in Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming combined. 
Even in states that prohibit private acquisitions, groups such 
as Trout Unlimited and the Colorado Water Trust report successes 
in restoring stream flows by working closely with state agencies 
and water right holders to facilitate voluntary transactions. In 
Idaho, Trout Unlimited worked with irrigators along Rainey Creek 
to obtain the first water donation to the Idaho Water Supply Bank 
for instream flow protection. In 2007, the Colorado Water Trust 
acquired consumptive water rights along a section of Hat Creek 
that provides critical habitat for local brook and brown trout 
Where the value 
of water instream 
exceeds traditional 
uses, the economic 
gains from trade 
may improve local 
economies through 
expansion in 
fishing, hunting, 
and recreational 
opportunities.
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populations. The water rights were donated to the Colorado 
Water Conservation Board to be converted and held by the state 
as instream flow rights.
Abolishing restrictions on who may acquire or hold water 
for instream uses would increase the opportunities for trade 
and enhance stream flows. Private interests wanting to protect 
or improve flows could rely less on political channels so that de-
mands could be met through voluntary transactions. Demands 
for environmental or recreational flows could then compete 
with offstream users in the same market setting. Water alloca-
tion would improve and economic gains would be recognized 
by water rights owners.
Through legislative reform, the same trading opportuni-
ties afforded to consumptive water users could be extended to 
instream flow users. One effective strategy to help overcome states’ 
reluctance is a gradual shift from state control of instream water 
to allowing private parties to participate in acquisitions and retain 
ownership of the rights. Montana and Utah, for example, adopted 
pilot leasing programs that permit private entities to acquire water 
for certain instream applications, while the state maintains some 
control in that it may repeal the program if deemed unsuccessful. 
This has not been the case in Montana, which has extended the 
program and now permits private entities to, in effect, acquire 
water in perpetuity (removing the limit on the number of times a 
lease may be renewed). Utah’s program is more restrictive, permit-
ting only private entities such as Trout Unlimited to lease water for 
fish habitat. Despite limitations, this legislation is a significant move 
toward greater private involvement and is a reasonable template 
for more restrictive states such as Wyoming and Idaho. 
Poorly Defined rights
One of the most important constraints affecting the trans-
ferability of water rights and the associated costs, whether for 
26      PErC PoliCy sEriEs
offstream or instream uses, is how clearly the rights are defined. 
In the context of instream flow trades, the benefits from better-
defined water rights are clear. In Washington, for example, the 
Department of Ecology, which is the largest acquirer of water for 
instream uses in the state, contends that the transaction costs of 
pursuing trades of un-adjudicated rights can be so high that they 
exceed the ecological value of increased stream flows.35 
As the value of water and economic gains from trade increases, 
whether for offstream or instream uses, the value of better defined 
rights increases (Anderson 2004; Brewer et al. 2007; Scarborough 
and Lund 2007). Buyers and sellers hire water consultants to speed 
the transfer process. Consultants research water rights to ensure 
the rights are defined and prepare necessary state forms. Just as 
when private property to land changes hands, experts bring par-
ties together and handle the formal paperwork.
Enforcement
The nature of instream flows, compared to offstream uses, 
complicates enforcement. Once water is diverted for agricultural 
or municipal uses, other potential users are automatically ex-
cluded from it (with the exception of return flows). Environmental 
or recreational flows are defined by a specific flow and reach, but 
unless monitored and enforced, are not excludable from diver-
sion by other users.
The likelihood that rights will be enforced depends in part 
on who the residual claimant to the water is. When the gains 
from ownership of water rights accrue directly to the user of 
those rights, any threat to entitlement is more likely to be dis-
puted and enforced. For example, any reduction in an irrigator’s 
access to entitled water directly affects profits. Similarly, an 
illegal or excessive diversion that reduces a rafting company’s 
instream flow entitlement is likely to be disputed. Conversely, 
when water rights are acquired and held by the state for the 
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public, the state is neither the direct beneficiary nor user. Thus 
any injury to those rights is less likely to be enforced (Sax et al. 
2000, 117), as evidenced by the few fines issued in Washington 
and Montana. The enforcement of state-held rights depends on 
the ability of the state to police itself on behalf of the public—
an “unlikely prospect” (Pilz 2006). 
Greater private involvement in instream flow markets 
improves the likelihood that stream flows will be enforced. 
Private parties monitor flows to ensure leased or purchased 
water remains instream. For instance, the Columbia Basin 
Water Transactions Program monitors flows on 90 percent of 
streams where it has acquired water rights for instream pur-
poses (Hardner and Gullison 2007). New technologies that 
record stream flow data over time or in real-time are helping 
to reduce monitoring costs, while improving enforcement to 
ensure flows are maintained. 
Until water rights are better defined, improved enforcement 
by state agencies is unlikely. States generally lack sufficient re-
sources to expedite adjudications, transfers, and disputes, much 
less to ensure water right holders are using their entitlements 
and not more. Conversely, private entities are motivated by the 
benefits gained from improved flows. As a result, instream ac-
quisitions are monitored and enforced. Putting instream flows 
in the hands of those who benefit can help ensure the intended 
goals are met, whether it is to restore the ecological integrity of 
salmon spawning habitat, provide sufficient water for recreation, 
or enhance the aesthetics of a free flowing stream. 
administrative Barriers 
Trading water for any purpose can mean substantial ad-
ministrative costs. Such costs can eliminate the incentives for 
improved water allocation. Before an existing diversionary water 
right may be converted to an instream right, it generally must 
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go through a formal change-of-use procedure with the state. 
The process is similar to transfers among consumptive water 
uses; however, in California, Montana, Colorado, and Utah, state 
fish and wildlife or environmental agencies are often involved 
in the process in addition to state water engineers or water 
courts. The process varies among states but typically includes: 
1) an application filed to the state water regulatory agency; 2) 
state inspection of the water rights; 3) determination if third 
parties will be affected by the change; 4) public notice; 5) 
public comments and protests; 6) a hearing (if needed), and 7) 
approval or denial. Each transfer or change of use is unique as 
the timing, complexity, and transaction costs involved depend 
on the nature of the transfer, third-party disputes, the state’s 
application process, and available resources to investigate and 
process requests.
One of the most time consuming and costly components 
of a transfer is defining the rights and the amount eligible for 
transfer. Historical use must be determined and often, from that 
amount, only the consumptive use portion may be transferred 
to instream. As stated previously, determining historical use can 
be a long process and subjective methodologies to determine 
consumptive use introduce added uncertainty. In Washington, for 
example, water rights holders would be far more likely to lease or 
sell water for instream use if they could simply trade paper water 
rights and avoid providing evidence of historical use.36 Limiting 
trades to historical use or consumptive portion of the right, albeit 
costly and time consuming, reduces 
the risk of third party injury and en-
largement of water rights.
The inefficiencies in the existing 
transfer process are epitomized in 
the time it takes to complete a trans-
action. In Washington, instream flow 
Putting instream flows 
in the hands of those 
who benefit can help 
ensure the intended 
goals are met.
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transactions, whether a lease or permanent purchase, can take 
more than a year; few are completed in less than six months. This 
stems from a lack of adequate resources to process the backlog 
of applications and settle disputes in a timely manner. In addi-
tion, the state lacks an easily accessible and current database of 
water rights, complicating the process of researching existing 
rights and identifying potentially affected third parties. Similarly, 
in Montana, if a change of use application is not disputed, the 
process can be completed in less than six months; however, few 
applications are approved at this pace. Problems in Montana 
include third-party disputes, inconsistencies in the application 
process, unclear recognition of certain uses of water instream 
as beneficial, and inconsistent methodologies to determine 
consumptive use portion of water rights.37 Moreover, in Montana 
and other states, the regulatory environment governing transfers 
and changes is continually being modified, which complicates 
the application and approval process and creates uncertainty for 
the applicant, the courts, and state agencies. 
In comparison, short-term leases and donations in Oregon 
may be completed in “as little” as four to eight weeks, with 
renewals processed even more quickly. Similarly, Colorado per-
mits farmers to loan water for up to 120 days to the state Water 
Conservation Board for use instream. The transfer requires only 
approval from the state engineer, eliminating the lengthy process 
of going through a state water court. Such temporary loans may 
be approved in as little as a month, while longer term leases and 
purchases generally take more than six months to process. In 
California, short-term transfers (less than a year) are processed in 
as little as two to three months, though long-term or permanent 
change-of-use applications may take years to complete. 
The approval process can be administratively cumbersome 
and costly to the applicant (Thomas 2005). When the state pro-
cess is slow, people learn to work around it. To reduce transaction 
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costs and bypass the lengthy application and approval process, 
conservation groups may contract directly with landowners by 
entering into forbearance agreements. The landowner is compen-
sated for reductions in water use or changes in the timing of use 
for the benefit of improved stream flows. The water right does not 
go through a change-of-use process nor is it filed with the state; 
rather, the agreement is strictly between the landowner and the 
demander of stream flows. Groups such as Montana Water Trust, 
Trout Unlimited, and Oregon Water Trust have had great success 
in providing needed stream flows for fish and wildlife on relatively 
short notice while establishing trust with consumptive water users 
who may be apprehensive about dealing with state agencies. 
information Barriers
Even before facing the difficulties and costs associated with 
poorly defined or enforced rights, and the legal and admin-
istrative process, demanders of instream flows must identify 
potential streams for restoration, locate willing sellers, and 
negotiate market prices. Immature markets lack multiple buy-
ers and sellers, creating uncertainty about prices and making 
it harder to obtain the information needed to ensure all parties 
that the terms of trade are accurate. 
Private entities and governmental agencies employ strategies 
to locate willing sellers and to negotiate prices for instream rights. 
One strategy is to offer a standing price for water and wait for will-
ing sellers. Local water banks in Idaho make standing offers for 
water, which may then be leased to other users at a set price. The 
Bureau of Reclamation leases water from these banks to supply 
instream flows for endangered species. This strategy is effective 
when not targeting specific stream segments or tributaries. Private 
entities, however, typically must rely on direct negotiations with 
landowners or indirectly through local conservation and irriga-
tion districts. The use of local and online bulletin boards, private 
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water consultants, and independent 
brokers has been effective in con-
necting buyers and sellers. 
Private entities have brokered 
nearly twice as many transactions 
as federal and state agencies com-
bined. By working cooperatively 
with landowners and local interests, private groups build valu-
able relationships, educating water right holders about instream 
flows and the potential of economic gains through markets, while 
gaining valuable information about market prices and expanding 
the pool of potential traders.
Cultural Barriers
The institutional barriers tend to differ across states, but a 
common characteristic is a general apprehension about leasing 
or selling water back into streams. Traditional thought was that 
water was to be used only on land applications (Meyer 1993; 
Schoeningh 2002) and that leaving it in its natural course was 
considered wasteful (Reisner 1986, 12). This sentiment still ex-
ists. There is a general resistance among farmers and ranchers to 
move water outside of agricultural uses for fear of diminishing 
local economies (Natural Resources Law Center 1997; Miller 2000); 
although transfers to environmental uses are often viewed more 
favorably than urban transfers (Ise and Sunding 1998).
Convincing consumptive water users to sell or lease water 
for instream uses remains a barrier to improving stream flows 
through voluntary trades. Rather than viewing water as an as-
set or input to a production process, it is typically viewed as 
property that should not be traded or used for other purposes. 
As a consequence, significant premiums are often necessary to 
entice sellers. WestWater Research,38 a leading water appraisal 
firm, estimates that a 50 to 100 percent premium over the agri-
Private entities have 
brokered nearly twice 
as many transactions 
as federal and state 
agencies combined.
32      PErC PoliCy sEriEs
cultural value may be necessary to entice sellers to move water 
away from its traditional use. Despite extensive negotiations, 
incentives such as cost-sharing agreements to improve water 
use efficiency, and market premiums for water, cultural appre-
hension may still limit transactions.
Water right transfers or changes in use, whether for instream 
or offstream uses, require state involvement. Throughout the West 
there is a general distrust of governmental entities when water 
rights are involved. This is particularly true when the acquiring 
entity is the state or federal government. Direct involvement by 
governmental agencies in water issues sparks fears of increased 
regulation and loss of control over private rights. 
Understandably, after multiple generations of investing in the 
production of food and fiber on the arid landscape, the idea of 
shifting scarce water resources away from agriculture to protect 
fish and wildlife populations, sustain recreation activities, and re-
store aesthetic beauty may seem like a foreign concept. However, 
increased efforts to improve information about environmental 
flows, acquisition programs, and financial opportunities for 
landowners, whether cost sharing for improved irrigation equip-
ment or compensation for selling or leasing water, are helping 
to improve the sentiment about water trading.
The most effective strategy to overcome social or cultural 
barriers is a bottom-up approach in which private demanders 
can negotiate directly with private right holders. Conservancy 
organizations have made significant progress in building rela-
tions with local landowners, irrigation and conservation dis-
tricts, and ditch companies through cooperative, on-the-ground 
contracts. Forbearance agreements or temporary water rentals 
that do not directly involve state agencies are also ways in which 
skeptical landowners can experiment with instream flows. There 
is generally little or no risk to other water right holders, the 
process is efficient, and the economic gains are clear. 
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ConCluSIon
Western states have adopted various means of trading water 
for instream purposes. In no state, however, are transactions 
considered easy, nor are they governed in the same manner as 
traditional water use trades. Legal barriers in Idaho, Utah, Wyo-
ming, Colorado, and New Mexico that place certain restrictions 
on private acquisitions or holding of instream flow rights leave 
demands unmet and water in undervalued uses. Where trades 
occur, the transaction costs are often high because of poorly 
defined and enforced water rights, ever changing transfer and 
regulatory processes, a lack of market information, and cultural 
and political values inconsistent with instream flow demands. 
As a consequence, economic gains and the incentives for trade 
and conservation are reduced. 
Overcoming these barriers is an increasingly important 
challenge as populations and western economies continue to 
grow. With this growth comes increasing demands for environ-
mental and recreational amenities. Efficient allocation of water 
among various instream and offstream uses is critical in the face 
of scarce water resources and changing demands. Regulatory 
efforts are insufficient and incapable of restoring or improving 
flows, while market trades have 
proven to be an effective and viable 
solution—especially where private 
demands can directly compete with 
other water uses. Removing barri-
ers to trade will reduce transaction 
costs, promote more efficient water 
allocation among offstream and 
instream uses, create incentives for 
improved water use, and improve 
environmental quality. 
The most effective 
strategy to overcome 
social or cultural 
barriers is a bottom-
up approach in which 
private demanders 
can negotiate directly 
with private right 
holders.
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noTeS
1  States examined in this report include: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
2  Preceding California’s statehood in 1850, much of the land 
claimed by miners fell under federal jurisdiction; however, 
there was little or no effective authority governing the 
allocation or protection of mining claims or water resources 
(See Umbeck 1977).
3  States appropriate large volumes of water to hydropower 
generation plants under the assumption that the use of 
water requires an actual diversion. However, the use of 
water for hydropower generation is non-consumptive and 
in effect an instream flow right (see, e.g., Anderson and 
Johnson 1986).
4  Although uncommon, an entitlement to use water may 
be diminished or eliminated without compensation 
under certain circumstances. For example, requirements 
of the federal Endangered Species Act supersede prior 
appropriation rights, thus water users may be prohibited 
from withdrawing water from streams or groundwater in 
order to protect species habitat. Similarly, the public trust 
doctrine maintains that states must protect waters for the 
enjoyment and use of the public. In National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court, the court ruled the city of Los 
Angeles’ water rights to be limited in order to preserve Mono 
Lake water levels (see, e.g., Libecap 2006). 
5  States may also prohibit or limit transfers of water outside 
of the source water basin.
6  Similarly, only a small portion of the more than 165,000 
claims submitted in Washington have been adjudicated 
and the state has no timeframe for completion. After nearly 
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two decades, Idaho recently completed the adjudication of 
more than 150,000 claims in the Snake River Basin. In 2006, 
the state began the adjudication process of an estimated 
24,500 water rights in the state’s northern watersheds. The 
process is expected to be completed by 2018; however, 
recent budget cuts, which have eliminated nearly half of 
their staff and opposition from water right holders who 
argue the process is too expensive, are expected to delay 
the process. 
7  The “no injury” rule was implemented to protect existing 
right holders from potential losses resulting from a change 
or transfer of other water rights. When a transfer is initiated, a 
public announcement is made (usually in a local newspaper 
or other media), giving other right holders an opportunity to 
dispute the transfer. If other holders believe the transfer or 
change will affect their access to water, in quantity, quality 
or timing, they may protest the transfer.
8  Evapotranspiration is the sum of water lost through 
evaporation, primarily from soils, together with the water 
lost through plant transpiration—the process through 
which plants transpire water, especially through leaves. 
9  Rankin Holmes, Project Manager, Montana Water Trust, 
telephone conversation, September 12, 2008.
10 As our understanding of the connection between 
groundwater and surface water improved, it has become 
increasingly common for states to require new groundwater 
withdrawals to be offset by increases to surface water. For 
example, a developer may be required to acquire surface 
water rights equal to (or in excess of ) the amount of water 
that would be withdrawn from a new well. 
11 An often cited example occurred in May of 2001, when 
the federal government, reversing a century of practice, 
cut water deliveries to farmers in the Klamath Basin in 
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Oregon. The water was instead allocated to maintain lake 
levels and stream flows for endangered sucker fish and 
coho salmon (Meiners and Kosnik 2003). Cases involving 
the public trust doctrine have been less common. Between 
1997 and 2007, Slade (2008) identified only four public 
trust cases in which water rights were altered for the 
protection environmental flows. 
12 In addition to excessive appropriations, groundwater 
pumping and changes in precipitation patterns over time 
have reduced the amount of water available to appropriators 
in many streams, in effect making the most junior water 
rights useless and many other rights unreliable.
13 Act of Feb. 9, 1915, ch. 36, 1915 Or. Laws 49, 49–50.
14 Idaho Code § 67–4301.
15 The term “minimum flows” is used somewhat generically 
as states vary in both the terms used to describe and 
the purposes for which they designate minimum flows. 
Montana uses the term “instream reservations”; Washington 
establishes “base flows,” but, like other states will often refer 
to them as “minimum flows” or “minimum streamflows”; and 
Oregon uses the term “minimum perennial streamflows.”
16 States have authorized administrative agencies to 
implement and/or interpret laws governing minimum 
flows. Depending on how the agency interprets the statute, 
regulation, or case law, it makes an administrative ruling 
on whether or not a stream section may be designated to 
minimum flows.
17 Administrative Rule of Montana 36.16.119.
18 Establishing minimum flows on streams currently lacking 
sufficient water for target species does not improve 
conditions since only the water not currently appropriated 
to other uses may be reserved instream. Therefore if 
the amount of water un-appropriated to other uses is 
EnvironmEntal WatEr markEts      37
insufficient to provide adequate flows, protecting those 
flows is unlikely to alter the ecological health of the stream 
above its current condition.
19 In cases where streams are dewatered for only a short period 
of time or through a specific reach each year, altering the 
timing or location of diversions can restore or reconnect 
stream segments. 
20 California Water Code § 1707(a)(1).
21 “Urgency changes” may be made in times of severe drought 
or water emergencies that require a timely transfer of water 
that would otherwise not be possible in time through 
the formal application process. California Water Code 
1435 provides that “any permittee or licensee who has an 
urgent need to change a point of diversion, place of use, or 
purpose of use from that specified in the permit or license 
may petition for, and the board may issue, a conditional, 
temporary change order without complying with other 
procedures or provisions.”
22 California maintains a complex mix of water rights including 
riparian, prior appropriative, reserved rights (water set 
aside by the federal government when it reserves land for 
the public domain) and pueblo rights (a municipal right 
based on Spanish and Mexican law). Moreover, California 
water rights are created and governed by various statutory, 
constitutional, and common laws, complicating the transfer 
process and introducing significant costs that often diminish 
or eliminate gains from smaller private transactions.
23 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37–92–102(3).
24 Wood River Minimum Stream Flow, § 1136, Fifty-ninth 
Legislature, 1st session (2007).
25 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.345, 533.360 (2001).
26 An acre-foot of water is roughly 326,000 U.S. gallons (1,233 
m3)—a volume sufficient to cover one acre of land to a depth 
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of one foot.
27 Each year of a multi-year lease is considered a transaction. 
For instance, a three-year lease agreement entered into in 
2004 would show up as a separate transaction in subsequent 
years 2005 and 2006 in terms of expenditures as well as 
water quantity restored instream. Often annual payments 
are made throughout the lease term, although leases may 
be paid for in full in the first year. Recording each year of a 
multi-year lease as a single transaction would yield 2,093 
total transactions.
28 All instream flow acquisition costs and prices have been 
adjusted to reflect 2007 dollars, using the Western Urban 
Consumer Price Index. 
29 These results should be interpreted with caution. There are 
other socio-economic factors—including, but not limited to, 
local water supplies and demand of instream and offstream 
water income, precipitation, opportunity costs of water for 
other uses, and population density—that may influence the 
institutional setting and the local market activity.
30 RCW 90.54.020(1), RCW 90.54.020(3)(a), RCW 90.22.010.
31 WS 41–3–1001. However, it is unclear to the author how 
designating existing flows (“un-appropriated waters”) as 
instream rights can “improve” fisheries, considering there 
would be no change to the amount of water instream, only 
protection from future diversions.
32 Legally, any individual may change their water right to 
instream use; however, the process is administratively 
cumbersome and to date no transfers have occurred. 
Transactions to enhance instream flows have been limited 
to the acquisition of federal or state storage water.
33 Instream flow transfers are limited to renewable ten-
year terms in Montana. However, there is no limit on the 
number of renewals, in essence creating the opportunity 
EnvironmEntal WatEr markEts      39
for permanent transfers to instream. 
34 New Mexico law does not explicitly preclude or permit 
transactions for instream flows. Unless denied by the State 
Engineer or challenged in court, any individual could 
conceivably lease or purchase existing consumptive water 
rights and convert them for environmental use while 
maintaining ownership of the rights.
35 Hedia Adelsman, Chair, Hydraulic Appeals Board, Washington 
Department of Ecology, telephone conversation, October 
3, 2008.
36 Amanda Cronin, Project Manager, Washington Water Trust, 
telephone conversation, July 14, 2008.
37 Rankin Holmes, Project Manager, Montana Water Trust, 
telephone conversation, September 12, 2008.
38 www.waterexchange.com.
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